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Playboy Indonesia and the media:
commerce and the Islamic public
sphere on trial in Indonesia
Philip Kitley1
Abstract: This article examines the reactions of conservative Islamist
groups to the publication of Playboy Indonesia and argues that their
views deserve more recognition than they have received. In November 2006, the Public Prosecutor sued the Chief Editor of Playboy
Indonesia for offending public morality. The prosecution of the
magazine signified concerns about the global spread of commercial media products and the circulation of sexual imagery derived
from other places, histories and norms. It was also about frustrated
political ambitions and the interest some conservative Islamist groups
had in reinstating the Jakarta Charter and establishing the rule of
Sharia law.
Keywords: public sphere; pornography; Indonesia; Islam; Playboy
Indonesia

Even before the bunny in the tuxedo hit the streets of Jakarta in 2006,
it was an endangered species. The publishers had nervously consulted
the Press Council about how they might make sure that Playboy Indonesia (PI) was in line with ‘community standards’, and prior to that
had made undertakings in the agreement signed with Playboy International that there would be no nudity in the magazine. Conservative
Islamic organizations such as the Council of Indonesian Islamic Scholars (MUI), the Council of Indonesian Mujahidin (MMI) and the largest
Muslim organization in the country Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) let everyone know that the bunny was in their sights (Bisnis Indonesia, 17 Jan
2006; The Jakarta Post, 14 Jan 2006; Suara Karya, 16 Jan 2006). Over
1
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the next few months, these early oppositional voices were joined by
the Vice-President, the Deputy Speaker of the national parliament, the
Ministers for Youth and Sport, Communications and Informatics,
Religion, Women’s Affairs, and the chairs of two parliamentary commissions, all expressing dismay over the prospect of the magazine going
on sale in Indonesia.
Shortly after the first edition was published on 7 April, the Defenders of Islam Front (FPI) vandalized the offices of the publishers, forcing
them to re-locate and publish the June and July editions from Bali.2 In
November 2006, the Public Prosecutor, acting on complaints filed by
FPI, brought criminal charges against Erwin Arnada, Chief Editor of
PI in the South Jakarta District Court for offending public morality. On
5 April 2007, one tumultuous year after the first edition was published,
the court found Erwin Arnada not guilty, ruling that the prosecutor had
erred in filing criminal charges, as the magazine was a press publication and that any action had to be brought under the terms of the Press
Law and not the criminal code. The legalistic character of the decision
frustrated those who had urged prosecution, as in their view, the court
had failed to engage directly with the circulation of pornography in
Indonesia.
The PI case brought to a head tensions that had been simmering in
Indonesia since the media deregulation following the resignation of
Soeharto in 1998. At first glance, the trial might be read as an attempt
to restore repressive regulations that the media industry had fought
hard to overturn, both during and since the New Order.3 A number of
expert witnesses at the trial argued along these lines, and their anticensorship views were strongly supported by liberal views in the press.
The attack on freedom of expression was considered particularly unfair by some witnesses who pointed out that there were many other
magazines on sale that were more indecent than the PI editions under
review, but were not subject to legal sanction. Indeed, it was the singling out of the brand Playboy Indonesia, even before it was published,
that signified that this case was never simply about a magazine that
declared itself to be ‘entertainment for men’. The prosecution of the
magazine signified concerns with the global spread of commercial media
products and services and the circulation of sexual imagery derived
2
3

The magazine continues to be published from Bali.
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from other places, histories and norms. Less directly, but equally importantly, it was about frustrated political ambitions and the interest some
conservative Islamist groups had in reinstating the Jakarta Charter and
establishing the rule of Sharia law.4
The highly sexualized imagery of contemporary advertising and television, cinematic and literary narratives has developed since the 1960s
in countries shaped by liberal discourses, which emphasized that sexual
representations were either harmless or beneficial, that individuals had
the moral right and competence to judge for themselves what was offensive, and by legal decisions that rejected claims that sexual content
was harmful, and therefore should not be restricted by law. Pornographic
content in the media in Indonesia, however, has become the site of a
struggle ‘… between those who assert their orientation toward values
of Islam and … [those who owe their status and ground their lives] in
the normative values of modernity – such as equality and liberty’.5
Issues of freedom of expression were clearly part of the discourse set
in motion by the trial. But unless the freedom of expression, anti-censorship model of the regulation of pornography is understood as a
historically and culturally conditioned construct, the conservative reaction against PI, along with the impetus to enact anti-pornography
legislation in Indonesia, will only ever be understood narrowly as a
‘… quaint relic and … reminder of an age in which the fear of sex had
obscured our knowledge of it ….’.6 This discussion will instead explore the discourses and institutions that shaped the concerns with the
publication of PI, concerns that were expressed forcefully prior to the
4

5

6

Habib Rizieq, personal interview, 11 September 2007; John Sidel (2007), Riots,
Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia, NUS Press, Singapore. The Jakarta
Charter was a proposed amendment to the preamble of the 1945 Constitution that
obliged the state to carry out the Sharia of Islam for Muslim citizens. The charter –
just seven words in Indonesian, was an attempt to accommodate Muslim leaders’
opinions that the first principle of the Pancasila in the original draft (that the nation
was founded on ‘belief in God’) was vague and even un-Islamic. Sukarno and Hatta
deleted the charter from the preamble, but did agree to revise the first principle to
read ‘belief in a singular God’, which brought it closer to Islamic doctrine about the
nature of God. The implications of dropping the charter have been a controversial
issue in Indonesian politics ever since. See Robert W. Hefner (2000), Civil Islam:
Muslims and Democratisation in Indonesia, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
NJ, and Oxford; and John R. Bowen (2003), Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Nilufer Gole (2003), ‘The voluntary adoption of Islamic stigma symbols,’ Social
Research, Vol 70, No 3, pp 809–828.
Ian Hunter, D. Saunders, and D. Williamson (1993), On Pornography: Literature,
Sexuality and Obscenity Law, Macmillan, Basingstoke, p 15.
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circulation of the magazine that for many was always fated to offend
public decency. Rather than adopting a position that assumes a narrative of a universal sexual self progressively liberated from state
intervention, this article explores the circumstances that have thrust
concerns with public morality to the fore, and links these concerns to
different cultural understandings of the dynamics of predatory globalization7 and the dynamics of a media-saturated public sphere historically
conditioned by a sudden expansion and deregulation of the media.
The Playboy Indonesia trial took place against the background of
intensive public debate in 2005–06 over proposed legislation against
pornography and ‘pornographic behaviour’ (pornoaksi, defined as ‘public
action that exploits sex, obscenity and/or erotica’). The intersections
between the Playboy case and the Anti-Pornography Bill (Rancangan
Undang Undang Antipornografi dan Pornoaksi) are beyond the scope
of this discussion and will be the subject of a separate publication in
which concerns over pornographic behaviour and representations in the
idealized Indonesian Islamic public sphere will be explored in detail. To
follow up on the anti-pornography debate, readers might refer to Pam
Allen’s comprehensive introduction to the anti-pornography legislation
movement, which she argues is ‘symbolic of a nation that is fearful of its
future’ and a desire for a particular ‘religious and cultural hegemony’.8

Media deregulation after 1998
B.J. Habibie took over as president from Soeharto during the Asian
economic crisis and faced considerable pressure from neo-liberal institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF to reform the media sector
as a way of encouraging and strengthening democratic transition.9 Domestic pressure for media reform was equally emphatic. Freedom of
expression and the freedom to access and circulate information were
inscribed in the People’s Consultative Assembly Decree XVII/MPR/
1998, in Law 9/1998 on Freedom of Expression, in Law 39/1999 on
Human Rights and in Article 28A-J in an amendment to the Indonesian
constitution in 2000. Press Law 40/1999 annulled the repressive press
7

8

9

Mustapha Kamal Pasha (2002), ‘Predatory globalization and democracy in the Islamic
world’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol 581,
pp 121–132.
Pam Allen (2007), ‘Challenging diversity? Indonesia’s Anti-Pornography Bill’, Asian
Studies Review, Vol 31, pp 101–115.
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laws of 1966 and 1982 and inscribed freedom of the press (kemerdekaan
pers) as a fundamental philosophical principle of the Press Law. The
Minister for Information responded even more quickly, cancelling licence
requirements for press publications and issuing five new commercial
television licences and hundreds of new commercial radio licences. He
even speculated on the abolition of his own department, something
that came to pass (but later) during the period of President Abdurrahman
Wahid. Since the first new television licences were issued, more have
been awarded and Indonesia now has 11 stations with a national reach
including the public broadcaster TVRI.
New media services have also shown remarkable growth since the
early 1990s, although statistics are often either unavailable or unreliable. The proportion of the population that regularly uses Web-based
technologies and services is probably only about 8% (in 2003) and is
not distributed evenly over the national territory.10 Internet users doubled in nine cities between 2000 and 2004. Mobile telephony has
proliferated, with 18.2 million users signed up in 2003.11 Streaming of
print texts on to PCs and radio, widespread public access to Internet
facilities through Internet cafés in major cities,12 and a massive growth
in traffic carried by Indonesian exchange servers indexes a steady takeup of new media technologies.13 Given the focus of this discussion, it is
interesting to note that Purbo discovered that ‘religion’ was the fourth
ranked subject of Indonesian e-groups – with more than 100 subscribers, and that ‘pornography’ was ranked seventh. Adi Nugroho reported
that the Indonesian-language site 17tahun.com, which presented sexually explicit stories, was accessed far more often than major
Indonesian-language media sites such as Kompas or detik.com.14
Everywhere, it seemed, in the Indonesian mediasphere, old repressive institutions were cast aside and new ones established, most with
principles that placed the democratic potential of the media, press freedom and professionalism centre stage. David Hill and Krishna Sen report
that even before the first Indonesian Internet service provider was
10

11
12

13
14

Persatuan Perusahaan Periklanan Indonesia (2005), Indonesia Media Guide 2005,
Persatuan Perusahaan Periklanan Indonesia (Union of Indonesian Advertising Companies), Jakarta. David Thomas Hill and Krishna Sen (2005), The Internet in
Indonesia’s New Democracy, Routledge, London, p 57.
Hill and Sen, supra note 10, at p 61.
In 2004, 62% of users accessed the Internet using warnet (warung internet) or Internet
café facilities. See Persatuan Perusahaan Periklanan Indonesia, supra note 10.
Hill and Sen, supra note 10, at p 59.
Cited in Hill and Sen, supra note 10, at p 73.

90

South East Asia Research

established, the democratic potential of the Net was the dominant discourse shaping its arrival, and ‘dystopic visions of the Internet … had
… very little impact in Indonesian discourses on the technology’.15
The new Press Law abolished the requirement that all journalists had
to belong to the government-controlled Indonesian Journalists’ Association, and 26 new journalists’ associations were quickly established.
The government-controlled commercial radio association (PRSSNI) lost
its gatekeeper role in approving new radio licences. Broadcasting Law
No 32, 2002 created an independent state regulator, the Indonesian
Broadcasting Commission (KPI), which was intended to improve the
transparency and accountability in licensing television and radio stations, and do away with the corruption and nepotism that had been a
notorious feature of the commercial television licences awarded by the
New Order government.16
These rapid and far-reaching changes in Indonesia’s media institutions were informed by discourses of democracy and liberalization.
The discourses foregrounded the keyword ‘freedom’ (kemerdekaan), a
term that resonated powerfully with the Indonesian revolutionary struggle, whose war cry (‘Merdeka!’) and outcome was ‘freedom’ for the
people and new nation of Indonesia in 1945. Rhetorically then, media
reform was understood as revolutionary, wiping away centralized,
oppressive structures and practices that had dominated the media during Soeharto’s New Order government. Media reform imagined new
media opportunities down to the grass-roots level, and offered civil
society publishing opportunities that had been completely out of reach
during Soeharto’s time. Opportunities for local and community radio
and television stations were created in a spirit respecting cultural diversity and participatory democracy.
The euphoria of these reform period discourses privileged liberalization and freedom of information, and while not silent on regulation
and censorship, gave these issues limited attention. The record of parliamentary debate on the Press Law (40, 1999) shows, for example,
that the central concern of the Playboy case – what publications were
to be judged likely to offend public morality – was not part of the
original draft Bill. The reference to indecent publications was proposed
by the Islamic United Development Faction (PPP). However, there was
no debate about what content might be indecent, nor what content might
15
16

Hill and Sen, supra note 10, at p 28.
Philip Kitley (2000), Television, Nation and Culture in Indonesia, Ohio University
Press, Athens, OH.
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be in conflict with religious norms. Article 13, Part IV, which forbids
press organizations to publish advertisements that offend public decency,
was also given very limited attention. Indeed, both matters were pushed
through in closed lobby sessions.17 Without the determination of the
PPP and somewhat grudging support from the Fraksi Karya
Pembangunan (FKP, Golkar), these vague references to ‘public decency
or morality’ would not have been included in the Bill. The FKP, for
example, initially took the view that these matters were adequately
covered in the criminal code and journalists’ codes of ethics.18 It was
as if no-one was interested in matters of censorship when the whole
thrust of the Bill was to inscribe freedom of the press, freedom of information and professional practice on the part of journalists and media
organizations. The PPP faction insisted that the Bill should not be seen
as ‘Liberal’ and was concerned about foreign investment in the media,
lest ‘liberal values’ should enter the country. These fears strike an odd,
discordant note in the context of the passionate argument in favour of
press freedom from the other factions who brought the Bill from first
draft to endorsement by the parliament in just 15 sessions from 7 July
1999 to 13 September 1999.
The freedom of the press discourse that contributed to the new Press
Law in 1999 and the Broadcasting Law in 2002 was informed by international discourses from civil society associations such as the
California-based Internews, UK-based Article XIX and UNESCO. These
associations, closely linked to the activists associated with the Indonesian Media Law and Policy Centre, promoted through training sessions
and their lobbying an understanding of the press as watchdog or fourth
estate, and promoted development of a public sphere that is perhaps
best characterized in terms of the Habermasian ideal of an open, democratic, dialogic space. The idea of press freedom, and the associated
notion that freedom of information is a human right, and that dialogical
engagement in the public sphere with others is a key element in every
citizen’s ideological identity are thoroughly international concepts and
part of classic Western theoretical understanding of the public sphere
as a space of participatory democracy. The imagined community brought
into view in the idea of ‘openness’ (offentlichkeit) in Habermas’s original
German, is a community of citizens who enjoy equality and under17

18

Indonesia Media Law and Policy Centre – IMLPC (2007), 15 Hari Perjuangan Untuk
Kemerdekaan Pers [15 Days Struggle for Freedom of the Press], IMLPC, Jakarta,
pp 1012, 1074, 1126.
IMLPC, supra note 17, at p 232.
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stand communal life as anti-authoritarian and invigorated by open social
relations among diverse people.19
The institutions and pedagogies brought into view through the discourse of press freedom include a wide range of independent, competitive
news and publishing organizations that have the freedom to pursue diverse political and cultural interests, provided they do so without insulting
or denigrating other ethnic, racial or religious groups. This normative
journalistic practice is matched by a disciplined practice of reading
and dialogue among audiences who are encouraged to engage with media
content in a way that sees its truths and meanings as contingent and
always open to interpretation and contextualization. Edwin Jurriëns
has described the growth of a genre of ‘meta-journalism’ in Indonesia.
The new genre performs a pedagogical role in guiding media audiences unused to the more investigative style and even oppositional
character of reform period journalism, on how to understand and engage with the outcomes of press freedom.20 A key feature of the
meta-journalism genre is that it is persuasive rather than authoritative.
Audiences are schooled in practices of questioning, checking and interpretation, all anti-authoritarian practices based on the assumption
that the press has no neutral or apolitical status and needs to be engaged in constructive and critical dialogue.
The historical context that drove reformist groups after 1998 to sweep
away the repressive apparatus of the New Order and establish Western-inflected legislation guaranteeing freedom of the press, freedom of
access to and circulation of information lent a particular cast to the
drafting and emphases in these various legal instruments. More ‘backward-looking’ issues of censorship and consideration of whether there
was any need to hold on to the idea that media content might occasion
social harm were more or less completely overlooked. The parliamentary record shows that when the FPP’s suggestion that press organizations
must ‘respect religious norms and the generally agreed sense of public
morality’ was up for debate, most attention was given to another normative requirement that the press should subscribe to the principle of
presumed innocence and not engage in ‘trial by the press’. This more
contemporary problem in media practice, in which, in the name of
investigative reporting, the media often resorts to sensationalism, was
19
20

Gole, supra note 5.
Edwin C. M. Jurriëns (2006), ‘Pioneering and monitoring press freedom: the creation of media-literate radio audiences in Indonesia’, unpublished paper presented at
ICAS5, 2007, Kuala Lumpur.
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debated at length, and the familiar, albeit vague invocation of religious
norms and (apparently) well known standards of public morality was
put in place without any extended consideration. The official gloss on
Article 5, Part II makes no comment on the norms and standards invoked, and simply suggests that the issue of what standards apply to
ensure that advertising does not offend against public morality were
‘clear enough’. This is unfortunate, as Articles 5 and 13 are just two of
only five that attract legal sanctions and heavy fines. The vagueness of
the idea of public morality in the Press Law echoes the vagueness of
the criminal code in which a similar phrase, ‘offends public morality,
or violates the sense of ethical standards’ (melanggar kesusilaan
[menyinggung rasa-susila]) appears (282.1). The official gloss offers
examples of what kinds of material might offend public decency and
suggests that books, illustrations, films and sculpture might all represent indecent content. The commentary goes on to note that what is
‘indecent’ is not absolute, but should be assessed against general or
public standards of propriety, and should be understood in its cultural
context on a case-by-case basis. The passage concludes by saying that,
in essence, what is indecent is media content that arouses sexual desire.21

Media liberalization and its discontents
PI shares a franchise family likeness with Hugh Hefner’s famous publication, but to anyone familiar with Playboy USA centrefolds and
articles, PI is far less sexually explicit. Photographs, advertisements
and columns certainly focus on heterosexual sex, but there is no nudity, and stories and cartoon captions are suggestive in a Benny Hill,
holiday camp style, more than being erotic or vulgar. Lacking the photograph layouts that present American Playmates’ bodies in intimate,
enhanced close-up, PI seems much closer to fashion magazines with
an emphasis on lingerie. Trial witnesses made this point, suggesting
that PI was less explicit than other local magazines in circulation such
as Dewi, Popular, FHM, Matra, the newspaper Pos Kota, and even, at
times, the women’s magazine Femina.22
21

22

Penjelasan 282, Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana (KUHAP) Explanation Article 282, [Indonesian] Code of Criminal Justice.
Efran Basuning, I Ketut Manika, and Eddy Risdianto (2007), Putusan No. 2362/
Pid.B/2006/PN.Jak.Sel. (Decision of Judges Efran Basuning, I Ketut Manika & Eddy
Risdianto of the South Jakarta District Court in criminal case 2362 2006), [hereafter
‘District Court bench’], pp 145–146, 160.
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The voices raised against PI, however, even before the first edition,
were clear that this was an indecent publication and an affront to public morality. The MUI took the view that the government’s support for
discourses of democracy, human rights and freedom of artistic expression was not balanced by a sense of responsibility to others, or by
consideration of the rights of others. The head of the MUI, Ma’ruf
Amin, stated that the government had ignored the fact that pornography and pornographic behaviour was spreading everywhere and was
liable to ruin national morality, especially the morality of the younger
generation.23 The MUI deplored the fact that publication of PI was
being given any serious consideration as it had issued a fatwa (legal
judgment, decision) against pornography and pornographic behaviour
in 2001, introducing a range of new media-linked offences such as circulating images of erotic behaviour; representing male and female body
parts that should not be exposed [aurat] (whether those parts are shown
naked or covered in tight or transparent clothing); screening scenes
that feature sexual relations and the representation of extramarital sex,
or any imagery likely to stimulate sexual desire.24 The first five paragraphs of the fatwa and its introductory statement are all concerned
with the role of the media in circulating pornography freely and widely
throughout society. The MUI’s concern with representations of forbidden images and behaviour in the media goes beyond the scriptural
authorities cited as authority for the fatwa, none of which make any
reference to the media, but restrict their comments to face-to-face behaviour and what parts of the male and female body it is proper to
display in public.25 Concerned about the alleged social harm that media representations may inflict on the community, the MUI put media
representations on a par with behaviour guided by Islamic codes of
conduct, updating the mediated semiotics of the codes of dress and
deportment, eating and sexual relations of traditional communities imagined in scriptures written long before the invention of modern,
globalized media technologies.
FPI leader Habib Rizieq acknowledges that media representations
are ‘fiction’ and that violent events in films are simply part of a narrative,
23
24

25

Bisnis Indonesia, 17 January 2006.
MUI (2001), Keputusan Fatwa Komisi Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia Nomor 287
2001 Tentang Pornografi dan Pornoaksi [Fatwa Concerning Pornography and Pornographic Behaviour No. 287 2001 by the Fatwa Committee, Council of Indonesian
Religious Scholars, MUI], MUI, Jakarta.
Ibid.
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but argues, echoing the concerns of the effects of tradition in American
reception theory,26 that these mediated events can have ‘criminal impacts’.
Rizieq cited a case of accidental death in Indonesia resulting from children
practising violent wrestling techniques on one another, and cited cases of
rapists admitting that explicit sex scenes in films had aroused them beyond their own control.27 Habib Rizieq’s comments assert that the social
harm that might derive from the media is broad-based and affects the
proper functioning of the Muslim community in Indonesia. He was concerned, for example, about Indonesian children answering back to their
parents as is often represented in films, saying that while that might be
acceptable and represent ‘freedom’ in America or Australia, it was not
acceptable behaviour in Indonesia. He was also concerned with the effects
of naming and blaming in the media, arguing that the public assassination
of an accused without trial can be very dangerous and might prejudice
trial outcomes. Media spokesperson for the MUI Amidhan commented
that, since liberalization, Indonesia had become ‘heaven for pornographers’, and that since the regulation that all publications needed to be
licensed had been abolished, the market was filled with low-quality publications that were published for a while and then quickly disappeared.28
Media Dakwah is the media organ of the Indonesian Council for
Islamic Predication, a conservative umbrella organization linked to the
former Muslim political party Masyumi.29 A review of the serial since
1998 shows that pornography has been a consistent concern for those
in the Muslim community who see affirmation of the faith (dakwah) as
both a political and religious obligation.30 Noting that ‘lately, it is as if
all the media, whether electronic or print, compete with each other to
serve up pornographic figures for consumption by the general public’,
the writer complains that if religious teachers ask the media to take
offending advertisements or programmes off the air, they are ignored,
but that if the military or a government minister complains about an
item that affects them, the problem is addressed immediately.31 More
26

27

28
29

30
31

Jack M. Mcleod, Gerald M. Kosicki, and Zhongdang Pan (1991), ‘On understanding
and misunderstanding media effects’, in James Curran and Michael Gurevitch, eds,
Mass Media and Society, Edward Arnold, London.
Personal interview, 11 September 2007. The mass circulation permits known as SIUPP
were abolished by Yunus Yosfiah.
Personal interview, 1 September 2007, Jakarta.
Robert W. Hefner (1997), ‘Print Islam: mass media and ideological rivalries among
Indonesian Muslims’, Indonesia, Vol 64, pp 77–103.
Hefner, supra note 4.
Media Dakwah, July 1999, No 301, pp 55–56.
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generally, however, the problem appears not to be a question of the
differential influence of religious and state authorities on the media,
commerce and advertising, but that state authorities have been generally lax in responding to complaints about policing the publication and
broadcast of indecent content.32 There is a view that since reformasi
[reform], press freedom has run out of control, and government has
gone soft on pornography: ‘In the history of this nation moral corruption has never been so explicit and freely available in public as in this
reform period via the press’.33 The reform period is compared
unfavourably with the New Order when a number of chief editors were
warned, fined, imprisoned for up to six months or had publication licences
revoked for publishing pornographic material.
The perceived indifference of state authorities in the reform period
to imposing limits on press freedom prompts a number of authors to
suggest that community action might be an alternative:
‘When the authorities can’t act. When they have failed. When political policy is bogged down. [Then] angry action from the masses is
an alternative. … if this goes on, it won’t be long until there will be
a mass action which will vandalise the offices or printery of this
wickedness.’34
In proposing a vigilante role for the community, Islamist writers are
responding to what they see as the fragmentation of the power and
authority of state authorities to exercise legitimate force following the
political sidelining of the military and decentralization of political power
after 1998.35 Although there is ample evidence to support claims that
‘criminal gangs, vigilante groups, and individual preman [thugs] have
established a lucrative yet unstable control over public space, such as
markets, terminals, and parking lots ….’,36 to understand Islamist groups
such as FPI and LPI and its ideological mentors such as the MUI as
simply opportunistic, criminal gangs intent on carving out monopolistic
32
33
34
35

36

Media Dakwah, June 2000, No 312, pp 44–45.
Media Dakwah, March 2000, No 309, pp 17–18.
Media Dakwah, June 2000, No 312, p 43.
Sukardi Rinakit (2005), The Indonesian Military After the New Order, ISEAS, Singapore; and Ian D. Wilson (2006), ‘Continuity and change: the changing contours of
organized violence in post-New Order Indonesia’, Critical Asian Studies, Vol 38,
No 2, pp 265–297.
Wilson, supra note 35, at p 291.
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protection rackets overlooks the religious motivations and performative, ritualistic quality of their activism.
The FPI and its operational force Laskar Pembela Islam (LPI) invoke a principle deeply rooted in religious philosophy and practice as
motivation for their activities. The duty of Muslims to intervene in the
face of wrongdoing is enjoined in Qur’anic verses ‘commanding right
and forbidding wrong’.37 It was this principle that informed FPI’s complaint against the publication of PI, which Habib Rizieq saw as ‘the
trademark for the pornography market … in America’. Rizieq takes
the view that each mass Muslim organization in Indonesia contributes
to the overall well-being of the community. As FPI does not have the
resources to build universities or Islamic boarding schools like NU or
Muhammadiyah, it does what it can to confront ‘real’, ‘concrete’ issues as a member ‘of a unity that cannot be separated’. In its ‘Call for
media morals’ (2000) and its complaints against 27 print media organizations, the FPI saw itself as confronting an aspect of contemporary
culture that had been overlooked by co-religionists. In its actions against
outdoor advertising of alcohol and the commodification and sexualization of women’s bodies, FPI saw its actions as bringing specificity to
the vagueness of the Qur’anic verses as to the object of wrongdoing.
Habib sees it necessary to be definitive, and argues that all of the FPI’s
actions are designed to get rid of the rottenness in public that tends to
corrupt and harm people, especially young people.38

Playboy Indonesia on trial
In the Playboy case, only two of the seven expert witnesses argued that
the magazine was pornographic and should be restricted. Noteworthy
in their evidence was the emphasis on the circulation of the magazine
in public. MUI member Amirsyah Tambunan stressed that it was not
the content of the magazine that was of prime concern, as the content
was acceptable for reading in private by married couples. What was a
concern, he argued, was the access that other audiences might have to
the magazine, as it was likely to arouse sexual desire among people
without partners, and was likely to ‘addle’ children’s minds because
they were not mature enough to understand the content.39 Bambang
37

38
39

Qur’an, S3:104, 3:110, 9:71, 22:41 and 31:17; Michael Cook (2003), Forbidding
Wrong in Islam, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Habib Rizieq, personal interview, 11 September 2007.
District Court bench, supra note 22, at pp 117–126.
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Supriyanto, an academic qualified in mass communication, drew attention to marketing issues, and argued that PI should be restricted to a
nominated market segment. Both of these witnesses understood the
problem with PI as one of who should have access to the images, rather
than the images themselves. In their view, social harm derived from
the unrestricted appearance and circulation of the magazine in public.
Their evidence on this point was supported by most witnesses – all
argued for tighter distribution of the magazine and even legislation to
manage distribution more generally.
The argument about distribution is an issue of boundaries. It turns on
a distinction between public and private, and takes us back to arguments about pornography that are largely unconcerned and uninformed
by contemporary discourses of freedom of expression and equality of
the sexes that have been decisive in landmark cases in countries such
as the UK, Australia and Canada.40 In Article 282.1, the offence against
public morality is above all the offence of deliberate display of offensive content in public. That is to say, the discourse is not about the
bogey of censorship as constructed in discourses of freedom of information and equality of the sexes. It is a discourse about managing the
public sphere in a way that prevents the social harm that may be caused
by indecent media content falling into the hands of vulnerable groups.
In Article 282.1, which outlines the offence Edwin Arnada was alleged
to have committed, eight of the eleven lines of the Article are taken up
with laboriously describing the manner of public distribution of indecent material. Written long before the fluid shifts of media content within
Castell’s space of flows were ever imagined, Article 282.1 conjures up
the rather muscular effort required to get indecent content, indeed any
content, into circulation. Here is the sense of the Article:
‘282.1: Whoever broadcasts, performs in public, sticks [on walls],
makes, imports into the country, distributes continuously throughout
the country, sends out from the country, keeps, explicitly [displays],
broadcasts written material, offers without being asked, displays so
that it can be obtained, written material, pictures or objects which
they know [will] violate the sense of morality, is criminally liable …’
40
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Here we are thrust into the business of circulating media content and
are transported into the public spaces of cities and towns where posters, announcements, cinematic shows, performances and printed material
are on sale in the streets. In brief, crimes against morality involved
distributing certain kinds of content in the public market for display
and/or sale. That is to say, the crime lay in the public display and sale
of content that should have been restricted to the private sphere and
particular audience categories who had the educational competence and
social status that rendered them not susceptible to its alleged harm.
The social harm of pornography was linked to the promiscuous circulation of restricted content in public where vulnerable audiences (children
and the unmarried) might gain access to it without the benefit of education or social status that would render it harmless.
In the UK, the distribution of ‘private’ media content in the public
sphere was regulated in past times by legislation that appears to have
limited connection with the legal instruments familiar today. In nineteenth century England, it was the Vagrancy Acts of 1824 and 1838,
the Theatres Act and the Libel Act of 1843, the Town Police Causes
Act of 1847 and the Indecent Advertisements Act of 1889, as well as
the Obscene Publications Act of 1857, which regulated obscene publications.41 The Vagrancy Act regulated itinerant hawkers who brought
obscene material into the marketplace for sale. The social harm from
peddlers of pornography was compounded by the hurly-burly of street
theatre, whose performances might easily excite and/or offend public
morality and occasion public disorder. Above all, the nineteenth century legislation was concerned with the maintenance of public order,
which was protected by making sure that there was no ‘matter out of
place’, to paraphrase Mary Douglas’s definition of ‘dirt’. Public order
depended on the careful management of the availability and consumption of media content. What might be seen by young men, boys and
girls passing through the streets, and what might be read in a library,
were two quite different orders of media consumption. This was a world
where the economics and marketing of media content, along with the
different competencies of audiences, were well understood and could
be policed relatively easily by including the trade in media products in
a variety of common law Acts so that the police could move people on
and prevent public disturbances.
In the Playboy trial, much attention was given to distribution and the
41
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access different audiences might have to the magazine. One of PI’s
agents testified that there was a written agreement between him and
the publisher that the magazine was not to be sold by him or his subagents in ‘public places’ such as on the streets, at traffic lights, or near
schools, mosques and churches. All sellers were to be at least 21 years
old. The agent testified that as far as he knew, PI was not sold in public, but from shops that were not near schools, mosques or churches.42
Chief Editor Edwin Arnada testified that he had taken particular care
over distribution, but that he was not responsible for agents who did
not honour the agreement. The agreement was that agents were not to
sell the magazine just anywhere or to just anybody, and that he had
made sure that the magazine was sold in a sealed envelope with the
notice ‘For adult men’ printed on it.43
The attention paid to the distribution, display and selling of PI echoes across time and space the concerns expressed in the Hicklin case,
which established a definition of obscenity that became the benchmark
for obscenity legislation in England, Canada and the USA.44 In Hicklin,
the court linked the potential for media content to ‘deprave and corrupt’ vulnerable audiences to the circumstances of commercial practices:
‘This work [The Confessional Unmasked] … is sold at the corners of
streets, and in all directions, and of course it falls into the hands of
persons in all classes, young and old, and the minds of those hitherto
pure are exposed to the danger of contamination and pollution from
the impurity it contains.’45
Expert witness Bambang Supriyanto’s testimony contradicted Edwin
and his agent’s evidence. He noted that the magazine was freely available on street corners and at traffic lights, and that that was a problem
because it contained material that was not suitable for young readers or
for public display.46 Echoing the discourse of educational competency
that had informed nineteenth century English regulation of indecent
publications, Bambang told the court that it was one thing for such
content to be discussed in a formal setting such as a school, but for it to
be freely distributed and available to minors meant that they were at
42
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risk, and without guidance might even be tempted to imitate what they
read.47 Expert witness Amirsyah Tambunan took a similar view, arguing that social harm was related to segmentation of the audience. If the
magazine were read by adult married couples in the privacy of their
home, then there was no problem with the content of PI. He suggested
that if distribution were controlled by making it available only to those
whose ID cards proved they were of age, then perhaps the issue of
harm to minors and other vulnerable readers could be prevented.48
Press Council member Leo Batubara agreed that the unrestricted
availability of indecent material put minors at risk, but stressed that PI
was an adult press publication, and ‘not something such as you might
find in Glodok’.49 Leo’s comment inadvertently conjured up the very
concern of those who had urged the court to prosecute PI: the spectre
of disorderly streets in a crowded, largely ethnically Chinese–Indonesian commercial area of Jakarta where indecent content was freely
available from street sellers for those with susceptible imaginations.
Restricting distribution and the segmentation of audiences was understood not only in terms of age, but also in terms of education and
class. Expert witness Dr Tanete Adrianus Pong Masak stated that he
thought distribution was not an issue, as the relatively high purchase
price would naturally restrict the magazine to the upper classes.
Atmakusumah drew the court’s attention to the subjective and classcontingent nature of pornography, noting that a ‘family’ magazine such
as Femina, marketed to middle class and upper class readers, frequently
published images that at times were more sexual than those in PI. But
because Femina targeted upper class readers, Atmakusumah suggested,
it was not considered pornographic. If the same images were published
in a tabloid, then, he argued, they would be. Atma also took up the
reception of literary works, arguing that explicit sexual content in artistic works was not pornographic, introducing into the debate the
distribution of critical literary skills in society, and arguing that what
was or was not pornography depended on the competencies and social
status of audiences.50 These references to class and critical competencies derived from formal education foreground the issue of the uneven
distribution of ethical and sexual competencies and pedagogical
opportunities across the community. The lower classes, it seems, were
47
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vulnerable in the same way as minors, as they lacked the social status
and educational background that would enable them to be discriminating in reading indecent material and avoid the excess of emotion it would
introduce into their lives. The social harm of pornography, then, was
related to its uncontrolled distribution in public and the potential for
disorderly behaviour, which was most likely to arise if the unschooled
lower classes had unrestricted access to indecent material. It is these
nineteenth century concerns about improper behaviour and relations in
public that are closest to the concerns that contemporary Islamist groups
such as the FPI have about PI and pornography more generally, but they
are grounded in different discourses and institutions, as we will see.

The FPI and ‘sweeping’
Islam is a diverse tradition and there is no single conception of the
public sphere in Islamic thought or among Muslims. This is particularly true for Indonesian Islam, which Sidel notes is ‘…famous for its
diversity, its organizational pluralism, its syncretic tendencies, and its
engagement with the secularizing forces of the capitalist market and
the modern state’.51 For more conservative Muslims in Indonesia, the
public sphere is an exemplary space in which proper relations between
members of the Muslim community are performed not just as a discipline of the self, but as a ‘technology of community’ through the
performance of cultural and religious identity.52 The ‘mega mosque’
projects in London, Cologne and Marseille, for example, can be understood as exercises in symbolic politics, where architecture on a massive
scale represents an assertion of religious and political community by
minorities seeking greater public recognition and integration in homelands where different faiths and institutions are hegemonic.53 In
contemporary Indonesia, the public sphere has both spatial and communicative dimensions that map new media flows over the space of
51
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social interaction. Far from being a dialogic space, however, where different ideas and strangers negotiate differences in the way Habermas
imagined in the bourgeois public sphere, for conservative Muslims, the
public sphere is idealized as a didactic, performative space where the rule
of Islamic law regulates social interaction. The appearance and conduct
of the pious, disciplinary self in the public sphere is distinguished from
behaviour in the private sphere where individuals exercise exclusive
authority and control over their affairs. Mohsen Kadivar comments, however, that the imbrication of public deportment with individual choices
about eating, sexual relations, dress and even economic relationships
means that ‘the Islamic public domain [is] … further stretched than that
prevalent elsewhere in the world’.54 In his extended study of forbidding
wrong in Islam, Michael Cook makes a similar point, noting that ‘… the
legacy of the privacy concerns of the medieval [Islamic] scholars is in
some tension with the collective and political orientation of the Islamic
revival. It is no surprise that in the event privacy gets relatively little
attention from the fundamentalists.’55 In contemporary cities, where ethnic
and religious groups tend to be dispersed across urban space, the necessity for different groups to share the same physical and virtual spaces
places a special burden on those groups that seek a close alignment between private and public domains of behaviour. This issue is taken up
again in the final part of this discussion.
In the Islamic public sphere, there are elaborate codes, varying from
nation to nation, and even within nations, which regulate the interaction of strangers, the most obvious sign of which are the codes that
govern display of women’s bodies. In contemporary societies, however, the media-saturated commercial sphere of urban settings creates
a contradictory space that challenges religious norms of public deportment and even traditional authority, as this comment from an
ethnographic study in Mali emphasizes:
‘In the Muslim world in particular the billboard now competes with
the Book as the purveyor of truths to live by (or, according to some,
of dangerous falsehoods to resist by every means possible), not to
mention the cultural influences of television and the internet.’56
54

55
56

Mohsen Kadivar (2003), ‘An introduction to the public and private debate in Islam’,
Social Research, Vol 70, No 3, pp 659–666, 663.
Cook, supra note 37, at p 129
Niezen, cited in Bryan S. Turner (2007), ‘Religious authority and the new media’,
Theory, Culture & Society, Vol 24, No 2, pp 117–134, 119.

104

South East Asia Research

Exhortatory banners urging citizens to participate in family planning,
welcome a conference group or maintain the spirit of Pancasila have
been a distinctive feature of the moral governance of Indonesian cities
and towns and ‘the preferred canvas for reaching the public’ for the
last 40 years.57 More recently, however, the commercial media, greatly
expanded since the reforms of 1998, energized by discourses of freedom of expression and the economics of marketing of global brands,
screen eroticized images and represent ‘lifestyles’ that are disapproved
of by Islamist groups. Advertising – in magazines, malls and on the
streets, has drawn the ire of groups such as FPI.
Mediated images of sexual behaviour enter the private sphere of the
family through the press, radio, television and the Internet. But the
circulation of electronic media content spills over into the public sphere
from TV sets in buses, in restaurants, in waiting rooms, shop windows
and inter-island ferries. Pop songs provide a constant background as
people travel, shop and work. Thus the electronic media turn the idealized Islamist public sphere into a contradictory, inside-out space where
sexualized images, performances, narratives and consumption practices
insistently intrude, seemingly beyond the control of individuals, challenging the norms of the Islamic public sphere and dispersing authority
for the management of the public sphere across an anonymous,
corporatized mix of local and transnational entrepreneurs, city authorities and advertising campaign managers.
When the boundaries of private and public life blur, some groups
take it upon themselves to perform religious norms as a pedagogic function and ‘technology of community’. Mehrangiz Kar has explored this
phenomenon in Iran, examining the ‘invasion’ of the private sphere by
state authorities in the name of ‘enjoining the good and forbidding evil’.58
Cole has discussed similar intrusions into the private sphere in the
Taliban’s obsessive zeal in making religion ‘completely public’ as a
way of establishing an Islamic countermodernity.59 In Indonesia, the
FPI has become notorious for its sweeping campaigns, which target
gaming houses, massage parlours, discos, bars and brothels. The Indonesian term ‘sweeping’, borrowed from English and Indonesian police
57
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and military jargon, is particularly resonant in this context. Metaphorically extending care of the private domestic sphere, FPI sweeping is a
way of caring for the public space of community that harmonizes the
space of community with the private, normative space of the family.
Simon Schama has written eloquently about the ritual cleaning practices of seventeenth century Holland, where the cleanliness of the home
was a way, symbolically, of repelling the ‘mire of the world’.60 In contemporary Indonesia, the more ambitious but equally moral venture of
cleaning the public sphere of vice is the symbolic burden of FPI sweeping. It is important to recognize that the FPI’s actions foreground (pious)
family values and have an appeal not only for an undifferentiated mass
of Muslims of one social class or other, but also for mothers and fathers, sensitive to difficulties in preserving control, or at least influence,
over increasingly threatened family units in a globalized, consumerist
world. During Ramadhan, the month of abstinence, the FPI engages in
performative rituals of cleansing, extending the private moral and spiritual cleansing practices of individual believers into the public sphere
when it attacks gaming rooms and brothels, massage parlours and restaurants open during fasting hours. Ritualistically focused on the sins
of the lower body,61 the performance of sweeping keeps the Islamic
code in the public sphere, countering the glossy commercialism of the
visual sphere and mainstream media, which does not feature Islam,
piety or adab [normative comportment] except in rather formulaic ways
in early morning ‘religious programmes’.62
Sweeping is performative in the same way that the voluntary wearing of ‘stigma symbols’ (headscarves) is in post-colonial societies such
as Algeria and secular societies such as Turkey,63 and national, televised Qu’ranic recititation competitions are in Indonesia. These are
60

61

62

63

Simon Schama (1987), The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch
Culture in the Golden Age, Alfred Knopf, New York, p 398.
Edward Muir (2005), Ritual in Early Modern Europe, 2 ed, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Somewhat surprisingly, the independent regulator, the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission, recently signed an agreement with the MUI that provides for the two parties
to share information and exchange views on media content, thereby privileging the
MUI’s views on what is ‘proper’ and meets community standards. See Nota
Kesepahaman KomisiPenyiaran Indonesia dan Majelis Ulama Indonesia Tentang
Literasi dan Pemantauan Siaran, 27 November 2007 (Memorandum of Understanding Between the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission and the Council of Indonesian
Ulama Concerning [Media] Literacy and Monitoring).
J.-C. Vatin (1983), ‘Popular puritanism versus state reformism: Islam in Algeria’, in
James Piscatori, Islam in the Political Process, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 98–121. See Gole, supra note 5.

106

South East Asia Research

practices that bring Islamic norms into the public sphere and assert
community values.64 Both practices thrust individual decisions about
deportment and piety into the public sphere, registering and demonstrating concern for the community and individual agency. These
practices are fundamentally about the politics of recognition, as Gole
explains:
‘Islamist politics makes religion visible as a personal sign, as an
embodied practice in public space … In this respect Islamism, along
with feminism, can be considered the most significant contemporary
social movement that attempts to blur and redesign the borders between
the private and the public spheres.’65
But while bars, brothels, discos and gambling dens are easily vandalized, the ephemeral, de-territorialized flows of commercial media present
more difficult theological and tactical challenges. Theologically, while
respecting what goes on in the privacy of the home is strongly established in Islam, there are differences in interpretation about what should
be done if a private wrong becomes public knowledge. If the wrongs
are straightforward – offences against dietary restrictions, let’s say,
then intervention is a relatively simple matter. But the modern mass
media position audiences as consumers of content, even though the
subject position and agency of audiences constitute a contested topic
in audience studies, especially in new media theory.66 But the mass
mediated content of the electronic media is not ‘privately’ consumed
in the way a book is read. Contemporary electronic media are consumed in private, but free-to-air content is public in the sense that the
same content is dispersed and circulated among a mass audience and
becomes a kind of cultural pollution in the perception of conservative
groups. This is the essence of Gitlin’s argument that in industrialized
and many other countries our social spaces are ‘saturated’ with the
media, and that ‘ … the media flow into the home – not to mention
outside – has swelled into a torrent of immense force and constancy, an
accompaniment to life that has become a central experience of life’.67
64

65
66

67

Anna M. Gade (2004), Perfection Makes Practice: Learning, Emotion and the Recited Qur’an in Indonesia, University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu.
Gole, supra note 5, at p 2.
Leah A. Lievrouw and Sonia Livingstone (2002), Handbook of New Media: Social
Shaping and Consequences of ICTs, Sage, London. See also Will Brooker and Deborah
Jermyn, eds (2003), The Audience Studies Reader, Routledge, London.
Todd Gitlin (2002), Media Unlimited, Henry Holt, New York, p 17.

Playboy Indonesia and the media

107

That is to say, the mass media complicate the problems of access and
distribution of offensive content in ways not imagined in nineteenth
century legislation, which was largely concerned with the localized
display, performance and distribution of obscene material. The ‘wrongs’
of contemporary media, however, including the potential menace of
Internet porn sites, are dispersed and insinuate themselves into the private
sphere, are ever present, and effectively inescapable. Under these circumstances, an activist disposition against offensive content in the
commercial media is understandable if theological injunctions against
‘quietism’ are heeded, and activists believe that state authorities have
abrogated their duty to prosecute manifest wrongs.68
Although there is no scope to explore this fully here, the FPI’s nontextualist activism may also be understood in the context of disputes
over the shifting fortunes and audiences of print Islam,69 and its recognition that for its largely urban, lower to lower middle-class following,
engagement with popular cultural media forms and spaces (the bars,
massage parlours and brothels of underclass life) is more immediately
communicative and has greater impact than articles in Media Dakwah
or Republika. Habib Rizieq was candid about the group’s invitations to
the media prior to planned raids and demonstrations. Thus FPI activities directed against the media recursively acknowledge and perform
the deep penetration of electronic media into Indonesian households,
and the group’s growing interest in media affairs is indexed in part by
the PI case and the FPI’s intention to establish its own Website.70
While the FPI’s attacks on premises, and against specific performances such as Nirul Daratista’s erotic dancing or the alleged denigration
of the prophet Muhammad’s daughter Fatima in the television serial
Esmeralda have established the FPI’s reputation as an activist group, it
has also had to deal with a backlash that in taking on themseves the
right to use violence against others, its members are ‘not defenders,
but destroyers of Islam’ and little different from other protection gangs
in Jakarta and other large cities.71 Aware of these criticisms, the FPI
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has turned its attention to outdoor advertisements that ‘stink of wickedness’ such as the giant advertisements for beer along major Jakarta
streets such as S. Parman and Gatot Subroto, or highly sexualized, pornographic advertisements that reveal parts of women’s bodies that should
not be seen in public.72 In attacking objects of wrongdoing, the FPI
aligns itself with teachings that the use of violence against offenders
by ordinary believers is not permitted. Even more recently, to distance
itself further from its gangster-like campaigns and reputation, the FPI
has taken its activism into the courts by pressuring state authorities to
prosecute PI as an ‘icon of pornography’.
The fact that the FPI resorted to litigation pragmatically recognized
that media flows, virtual bodies and fictional lifestyles could not be physically attacked. Thus in the PI campaign, the FPI’s activism was tactically
adjusted, and its mission to forbid wrong and prevent social harm took
the form of due process in initiating litigation in the name of the community – admittedly after an unfortunate lapse into old habits when it
vandalized the PI offices. In taking this step, the FPI found itself allied
with the elevated and equally outraged vice-president, numerous ministers and other leading national Islamic organizations. But one swallow
does not make a summer, and the FPI’s angry reaction to the legalistic
decision of the South Jakarta District Court, and its continued vandalism against premises associated with vice, suggest that it has not
abandoned its policy of rectification in lieu of the lapsed state.73

Media literacy and the ethics of commanding right and
forbidding wrong
The argument here is that the campaign against PI is best understood
as the expression of concern by conservative Islamist groups for the
normative character of the public sphere, and that this concern should
not be understood as the kind of censorship struggle that characterized
obscenity trials in England and Australia in the 1970s. The free press
discourse that informed the testimony of the majority of expert witnesses at the PI trial asserted values that did not address the concerns
of conservative Islamist groups. Habib Rizieq and Muslim scholars
have stated that they endorse freedom of the press and freedom of opinion, citing Qur’anic authority for their views.74 What they do not endorse,
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however, is an ‘irresponsible press’, and in taking that view they line
up with ethical values inscribed in the codes of practice endorsed by
the leading Indonesian journalists’ associations, all of which affirm
non-discriminatory reporting, respect for religion, and sanctions against
publishing or broadcasting indecent content. Here then was a case in
which discourses of liberalization, and of religious identity and prevention of harm passed each other by, and the furore that accompanied
the trial and the court’s decision arose out of a critical misunderstanding that must be contextualized by setting the trial within the dynamics
of the deregulation of the media post-1998 and the print media’s representatives’ mission to affirm and protect newly legislated rights of
freedom of opinion and freedom of the press.
What complicates the FPI’s activism, anti-PI and anti-pornography
advocacy is a tendency to overstate its case in linking it to larger, more
general concerns about the sudden expansion of the commercial media,
which has circulated globalized media products and services throughout
Indonesia, and a perceived loss of identity and political power in postreform society.75 In addition, Islamist groups such as the FPI have a
reputation for rather simplistic and violent solutions to complex social
and ethical questions, and the religious or ideological foundation of their
protest against the media has been too easily dismissed as the rationalization of a fundamentalist, gangster fringe. If the Islamist objections to PI
are understood, however, as a principled objection to the shift in responsibility for the normative space of community, then what is in dispute
becomes more amenable to solution as it resolves into a debate about the
management of globalized commerce and cultural pluralism in cities. Not
that these are simple issues, but framed this way, the dispute is shifted into
an area that is less likely to break down into unhelpful and simplistic
assumptions that what is at stake is a clash between backward fundamentalists and enlightened progressive modernists.
The FPI’s activism in aggressively attempting to regulate media content
has a solid ethical and religious foundation, but is misguided and signifies confusions about the sociological, religious and political realities
of Indonesia, which is not an Islamic state, or a secular state, but a
constitutionally established, multi-faith state. The ethical grounds for
vigilantism have a superficial legitimacy, but do not stand up to close
examination, as forbidding wrong too easily becomes ‘ … a practice
for telling people what to believe and how to live’.76 In a hybrid, multi75
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faith society, even where the majority of the population are Muslims,
this is ultimately discriminatory. The FPI’s resort to the rule of law
over Playboy Indonesia is promising as it offers a mode of regulating
media content without violence and in a way that recognizes ‘community standards’. The Indonesian Broadcasting Commission has taken a
step along this path, and has established specific guidelines on broadcasting standards and practices that urge broadcasters to take care that
their content ‘does not destroy, generate negative effects, or conflict
with fundamental values of the multicultural and very diverse Indonesian audience’.77 The FPI has no legal right in contemporary Indonesia
to usurp the state’s role, but it does have the right and opportunity to
press its case for regulation of the public sphere in a way that respects
its values.78
The violence of the FPI against various forms of vice and pornographic content in the mass media reflects a series of absolutist confusions
over the ethical, spatial and political reality of contemporary society
and urban living, which will be outlined briefly before turning to some
reflections on how the struggle over the public sphere might be managed differently. There is no scope here to explore questions about
whether or not there is strong support for the kind of Islamist politics
the FPI has waged since 1998. The evidence seems to be that there is
not.79 The emphasis here is on the more restricted question of whether
or not absolutist attempts to reconfigure the public sphere to reflect the
normative views of a conservative Islamist constituency are grounded
in the circumstances of post-reform Indonesia.
First, in contemporary Indonesia urban spaces are hybrid – they are
not ethnically, culturally or religiously bounded, and religious activism that ignores this reality misunderstands the sociological and political
realities of the nation-state. There is no possibility of re-establishing
the exclusive communities of the colonial past, and the incorporation
of the Jakarta Charter into the constitution has been decisively rejected
by the most influential institutions in the country. Where community is
dispersed and shares space with others, tensions naturally arise, but the
solution to these tensions does not lie in the radical regress of ethnic or
cultural cleansing. It is often the case that co-religionists of whatever
faith have internal divisions every bit as profound as those that separate
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ethnic or religious communities, as the FPI’s attacks on the Liberal
Islam Network (JIL) show. Thus culture wars that imagine a ‘pure land’
are violent fantasies of a minority and run the risk of cannibalizing the
community they are ostensibly protecting.
Urban spaces are not only hybrid, they are de-territorialized in the
sense that they are no longer simply national, and it is a mistake to
think that there is a way back from these processes of global integration. To some extent, all constituent elements of urban communities
are dispersed and even globalized. Indonesian Muslims are part of a
global Islamic community and have historical, cultural and commercial associations with co-believers in other parts of the world. Indeed,
the FPI was founded by people of Hadrami Arab ethnicity who had
enjoyed educational opportunities in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These
transnational associations open local communities to the diversity of
co-religionists’ communities across the world and warn against inflating the purity of imagined, Islamist communities and ways of life that
pay little respect to customary practices and the history of Islam, both
locally in Indonesia itself and more widely across the Islamic world.
The de-territorialization of the public sphere brings benefits to all sectors of local communities through a range of interactions, not least of
which are the benefits of economic relations, communication and
knowledge, which may contribute opportunities for diasporic communities to maintain productive associations with co-religionists around
the world.
The space of urban communities is not simply physical space, and
activism premised on winning local skirmishes misses the bigger picture. Urban spaces are nodal in character and hubs of transportation,
commerce and communication networks. Traditional ideas and patterns
of rootedness intersect with the virtual flows of contemporary communications, global distribution networks and differentiation of markets
and tastes. While globalized flows may introduce disruptive and offensive content and practices, these concerns are widely shared, even if
the targets of concern may differ in intensity and specificity. Concerns
over child pornography and the use of the Internet in facilitating paedophilia, for example, are widely shared and transnational cooperation
has been effective in policing this. More positively, the new media
offer interest groups virtual communities or counter-publics in which
their preferred way of living may be sustained and reinforced without
doing physical violence to the Other’s normative practices and principles. Even so, alternatives may degenerate into ‘hate sites’, and there
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is no particular virtue in simply transferring intolerant relations to a
parallel online universe.80
While some practices and activities in the public spaces of cities
may be vulnerable to violent attack and physical confrontation, others
are not – and ideological clashes over the content of the media are not
particularly susceptible to physical violence, even though there have
been spectacular and at times amusing ‘jamming’ campaigns against
advertising.81 Whereas not so long ago most revolutionary movements
made the occupation of broadcasting stations their first priority, the
dispersed character and international networking of broadcasting and
new media services make any attempt to control media flows by occupying broadcasting premises quixotic. Governments have found it
extremely difficult to close down access to new media. Electronic and
Web-based media are elusive, resistant and resilient in the face of physical
and technological attacks, and are not rooted in any particular territory.
Vandalism and attempts to ban electronic media and even print publications for whatever reasons are a temporary and ineffective policy
response. The migration of Tempo magazine to become a thriving online
presence via servers located in the USA after it was banned in 1994
provided ample evidence of this.82 Physical violence may spread fear,
but is strategically counterproductive as it is unlikely to affect directly
key players such as the financiers, producers and distributors who are
often dispersed across complex commercial structures and not susceptible to physical confrontation. With these changes well established
and distributed worldwide, it is obvious that we cannot return to an
imaginary community of origin – and the fatwa on pornography shows
that the MUI is alive to the need to take cognizance of modern media
realities. More positively, the Web has become a valued space for a
whole range of Muslim groups to open up dialogue with co-religionists
across the world and think through important issues and questions.
The commodification of urban spaces and their communication and
entertainment networks presents challenges to groups whose cultural
values and aspirations are different from the dominative practices of
international capitalism. But these same networks also mediate
80
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cosmopolitan empathy, which may over time be constitutive of more
tolerant and profound cross-cultural relations.
These four interlinked confusions provide the foundation for a way
through the problem of dominative solutions to the character of the
public sphere. They acknowledge both religious discourse and the contributions of discourses such as sociology, media studies and political
science in managing social change and lessening anxiety about religious boundaries and religious identity. The way through these problems
lies in a mix of civility, educational and regulatory initiatives, many of
which are already in place, but need consistent support.
The argument for civility begins with the assumption that the public
sphere is a field of contested meanings, values and practices, created
and sustained by a set of power relations and institutions, economic
and cultural interests. The public sphere in all its complexity of publics
and counter-publics and modes of interaction is a hegemonic field, and
as such, constituted in difference and susceptible to change. Put another way, conservative groups of whatever stripe cannot assume that
the public sphere can be re-configured as a strong, uni-dimensional
institution that imposes its normative validity on citizens. The competing discourses of the contemporary public sphere have unsettled authority
to such an extent that whatever power the public sphere has to influence citizens will depend more on finding reasons for having things
the way they are than on attempting to impose a preferred order through
symbolic means or force.83
Indonesia is not a secular state; it is not an Islamic state: it is a religious, pluralist state, and that requires all interest groups to take seriously
the ways different communities want to imagine the public sphere. It
is, after all, a dynamic cultural and historical construct, and its current,
highly ‘re-feudalized’ commercial character does not represent the final word on the scope and form of the visual and public spheres.
The issue of the voluntary manifestation of belief and the obligatory
public regulation of belief are in tension at a time when traditional
sources of authority are under challenge from the spread of educational
opportunities, media technologies and the creation of diasporic communities. There are signs, however, across the Muslim world, that
voluntary practices for signifying religious identity are intensely satisfying, perhaps all the more so as a signal of positive choice in performing
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belief.84 New media technologies also provide ways of sharing knowledge and asserting identity, although they also tend to undermine
traditional oral and print-based authorities. Even so, the new media
(although limited to more affluent sectors of the population) is a dialogic
space of ‘performativity’, in which a lot of the discussion is ‘… about
the proper conduct required by a “good Muslim” in a variety of contexts and circumstances’.85
The argument for education begins with the assumption that discussions about pornography must necessarily involve an analysis of the
historical, cultural and economic discourses that have shaped different
societies’ understanding and policy responses. An important dimension of this project will involve media literacy programmes to educate
the community about processes of representation and the construction
of meaning, reception and the passive-active audience, along with the
political economy of the circulation of media content. Lively and informative meta-journalism programmes have been implemented in
Indonesia, but there is a lot more that needs to be done and protected
by regulation, given the asymmetry in the power that commercial organizations and fragmented social solidarities can exert in lobbying
for programming time.86
The arguments for regulation begin with the observation that the media
are subject to regulation, and in Indonesia media deregulation has been
accompanied by the institutionalization of regulatory policies that promise far greater accountability and transparency in media business than
during the New Order period. It is here that the FPI might direct more
attention and work collaboratively with the KPI and civil society
organizations intent on building a more responsible media environment. The KPI’s classification standards are explicit and comprehensive,
and establish guidelines over content, restricted viewing hours for certain categories of programme and opportunities for audiences to make
informed choices about what they watch. Similar guidelines are required to manage distribution and access to press publications. Media
regulation and standards need to be extended to advertising, as the two
are inextricably intertwined. Advertising across all sites, especially out84
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door sites, needs to be brought within a standards regime that is sensitive to community groups’ normative and aesthetic principles. Above
all, the standards need to be effectively policed to forestall attempts by
vigilante groups to take it on themselves to usurp state authorities’
roles and obligations.
The introduction of advertising standards in the electronic and new
media is especially important for protecting children from a variety of
negative influences. Advertising standards that are sensitive to the longterm negative effects on children of advertising that represents idealized
body shapes and precocious sexualized styles will assist in preventing
eating disorders and the construction of children as sexual subjects for
commercial gain. There are, however, significant structural problems
in Indonesia in regulating advertising to protect children. With Indonesian schools operating on an early morning and a midday shift timetable,
commercial broadcasters are reluctant to quarantine advertising across
not just one, but two daytime periods, as it restricts their scope to address adult audiences. Further, adult working hours do not map neatly
over the school timetable, and it is often the case that children are without
adult guidance during the day.

Is there a place for the law in regulating pornography?
The rule of law offers the best hope for respecting, promoting and protecting normative values of diverse community groups. High-profile
trials such as the PI case publicize contentious issues for community
debate, and the comprehensive presentation of argument against publication opens up the likelihood of wider support. It is important to note
that Christian groups joined the Islamic community in objecting to PI.87
In working through the rule of law and not the rule of the fist and
club, the FPI demonstrated an encouraging shift away from its bullying tactics in forbidding wrong. The outcome of the trial was no doubt
unsatisfying in that it failed to clear PI off the streets and did not engage with many of the issues outlined above. But read differently, as
has been demonstrated here, the trial opened up critical issues for Indonesia in the management of both religious and media affairs, and
could be the impetus for revisiting principles and practices of accountability that have been established since 1998. Equally informed by
discourses of accountability and liberalization, the regulatory machinery
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of the Broadcasting Act and the Press Law offers as much to conservative groups as to the usual suspects imagined as the beneficiaries of
‘liberal’ law. A new trial brought in terms of the Press Law may not
deliver the FPI the outcome it wants – again because the terms of the
offence of publishing indecent material are so vague that it will be hard
for the court to resolve a single, agreed truth about what is to count as
pornography in a society as diverse as Indonesia. But what the trial
may do – and this may be socially and culturally very constructive – is
take seriously the contours and character of an imagined Islamic public sphere and address the aesthetic, moral and symbolic construction
of the public sphere in Indonesia more generally. This may promote a
wider debate and interest in shaping the public sphere in a way that
better reflects the cultural and political aspirations of post-reform Indonesia and brings commercial imperatives more in line with Indonesia’s
evolving cultural as well as economic priorities.

